Introduction
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA) created a temporary tax holiday that resulted in $312.3 billion in extraordinary cash dividends from foreign subsidiaries to their U.S.-based parents (Redmiles, 2008) . The payments came at substantially reduced tax rates but also had strings attached, namely that the funds had to be spent on certain permissible domestic activities, and specifically not on dividends or share repurchases. Prior research has shown that firms nevertheless made shareholder payouts with repatriated funds (Blouin and Krull, 2009; Clemons and Kinney, 2008; Dharmapala et al., 2011) . These results have come to attention of Congress, particularly the finding of Dharmapala et al. (2011) In this paper, I prove that the $0.60-$0.92 range for 2005 shareholder payouts is completely incorrect. What I provide is truly a proof and not just a statistical estimate of high probability. In fact, I show that total amount of cash, whether repatriated or not, spent on shareholder payouts in that year was so small that no more than $0.55 per repatriated dollar could possibly have been spent in impermissible ways.
I also address the question of how the money was actually spent, with a focus on the firms that made the 20 largest repatriations and accounted for 56% of all repatriated cash. I perform firm-by-firm regressions and impose firm-specific constraints reflecting the fact that the spending of repatriated dollars on a given item in a given year cannot exceed the total spending of dollars on such item in such year. I do not compare repatriating firms to otherwise comparable non-repatriating firms because no such firms of the latter type generally exist for the relatively few firms that repatriated most of the cash. These include most of the largest U.S.-based multinational firms in the consumer staples, health care, and information technology sectors, and most peer firms were in fact repatriators themselves. In addition, the applicable firm-specific constraints serve to limit further any potential comparisons. Accordingly, I consider each firm in isolation and determine the best possible firm-level point estimates for what spending actually took place, and when. I also extend my analysis to 341 firms not in the top-20, which account for 37% of all repatriated cash. My firm-specific approach may no longer be necessary for many of the firms in this group, but it is still correct for the relatively few firms that comprise the bulk of the cash repatriated by this group. Applying my analysis consistently to the entire group avoids an artificial cut-off, and my estimates of total dollars spent on items naturally weight firms according to number of dollars they repatriated. For the 341-firm group, I find that at least $0.61 was spent on permissible uses. The estimates for acquisitions and R&D are smaller than for the top-20 firms, at $0.17 and $0.03 per dollar, respectively. The estimate for debt repurchases is larger, at $0.29 per dollar. There is also a positive estimate for capital expenditures, namely $0.06 per dollar, and the estimate for pension funding is the same as for the top-20 firms, at $0.01 per dollar. The remaining $0.46 per dollar was constituted share repurchases, dividends, and amounts unexplained by the regression, split as $0.37, $0.02, and $0.06, respectively.
My results are based on publicly available information and reflect firm spending on a consolidated basis. This does not allow for identification of which spending occurred domestically, as opposed to abroad. For purposes of my analysis of shareholder payouts, however, the distinction is irrelevant. Shareholder payout were simply disallowed under the AJCA, regardless of whether they were made to domestic or foreign shareholders. With respect to other items, spending was generally permissible under the AJCA if it was done domestically.
As a result, it would be desirable to have a sense of where spending occurred. In the case of the most substantial spending item for the top-20 firms, namely cash acquisitions, cash acquisitions of foreign firms were allowed to the extent the firms had U.S.-based assets that were acquired. I list in Table 8 many of the specific transactions that occurred and note that these were generally domestic in nature or had substantial domestic components. It thus appears that a significant amount of domestic spending occurred, but future research into the geographic components of spending on other items, such as debt reduction, would be valuable.
My proof with regard to shareholder payouts serves as a cautionary tale about misinterpretation of research results and the importance of recognizing heterogeneity in data. The $0.60-$0.92 range found by Dharmapala et al. (2011) comes from a two-stage research design that is not dollar-weighted and that identifies spending within a certain identified subgroup, namely the firms with low foreign tax rates or with subsidiaries in tax havens. Extrapolation from this result to statements about the typical dollar spent by all repatriating firms is unwarranted and incorrect. In fact, it seems that it may not even be a fully correct description of typical dollars spent within the subgroup, because the top-20 firms I study all appear to have been members of the subgroup. As I explain in Section 5, this leads to an absolute My results may seem puzzling because of the implications for the behavior of corporate managers. Money is fungible, and the law did not require tracing of funds spent. In fact, the law even allowed repatriated funds to be used for activities that would otherwise have been carried out anyway. Why would managers at firms like the top-20 repatriators, which were well-governed and not financially constrained, not make very substantial shareholder payouts right away? They could follow the letter of the law by tagging existing projects as the places where the repatriated money was spent and just use "freed-up" funds, a term introduced in this context by Graham et al. (2010) , for share repurchases and dividends. My findings cannot determine a definitive answer to this question, but a simple explanation is possible.
Firms are engaged in a very long-term game with the government, and although they might have wanted to spend more repatriated funds on immediate shareholder payouts, they also wanted future holidays, or other types of future tax reform. Although the government allowed substantial flexibility in its rules regarding the AJCA holiday, there were clear intended My results should be of relevance to policy-makers as well as to academics. Congress has repeatedly expressed a keen interest in the treatment of offshore funds that have not yet been taxed in the U.S., 1 and the belief that firms wantonly violated the rules of the AJCA tax holiday has caused many to question the wisdom of future holidays.
2 There are many arguments to be made about the optimal path for international tax reform, and I have made the case against temporary tax holidays myself on grounds unrelated the question of shareholder payouts (Brennan, 2010) . For present purposes, I do not take a position about what type of reform would be best, but I hope that my results can serve lawmakers by providing more accurate information for a well-informed debate. As I document, there were shareholder payouts, to be sure, but they were far less in dollar terms than has previously been believed. In addition, much of the repatriated money was used in permissible ways, meaning that firms largely followed the rules set forth by Congress.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. 1 The House is currently considering comprehensive tax reform measures that include a permanent reduction in tax rates on foreign earnings, rather than just a time-limited holiday. Details are available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/taxreform. In addition, legislation for further holidays has previously been introduced in both the House and the Senate. Specifically, on May 11, 2011, Congressman Brady introduced the Freedom to Invest Act of 2011, HR 1834, and on October 6, 2011, Senators Hagan and McCain introduced the Foreign Earnings Reinvestment Act, S 1671.
2 Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2011), for example, reviewed existing academic literature and surveyed 19 firms that repatriated under the AJCA holiday. That report concluded on page 3 that "rather than producing new jobs or increasing research and development expenditures, the 2004 repatriation tax provision was followed by an increase in dollars spent on stock repurchases and executive compensation."
Related Literature
I am not the first to critique the results of Dharmapala et al. (2011) . Petersen and Faulkender (2012) have raised methodological concerns about the approach used by Dharmapala et al. (2011) . They argue that Dharmapala et al. (2011) do not correctly identify the response to cash repatriations because they compare firms that would be predicted to repatriate against firms that would not be predicted to repatriate, with the former group pooling together both firms that actually repatriated and those that did not. Petersen and Faulkender (2012) contend that the right approach is exactly to compare the two types of firms conflated into a single group by Dharmapala et al. (2011) . The results of the alternative analysis carried out by Petersen and Faulkender (2012) differ substantially from those in Dharmapala et al. (2011) . They find that there were not in fact significant share repurchases. They also find that financially constrained firms increased spending in ways that were permissible under the AJCA, while financially unconstrained firms did not increase spending. This last result may be explained by the fungibility of money, particularly because the AJCA did not require tracing of funds. Dharmapala et al. (2011) were aware of the critique by Petersen and Faulkender (2012) and address it directly in their paper, defending their methodology and arguing that the proposed alternative has econometric problems. There has thus been a debate in the literature over which approach, and consequently which set of results, is correct. This debate is particularly hard to resolve because the underlying data in the two papers are different, with Dharmapala et al. (2011) relying on non-public BEA data, to which access is very limited, and Petersen and Faulkender (2012) using data from publicly available information, particularly financial statements of firms.
Like Petersen and Faulkender (2012) , my critique relies on publicly available data. Nevertheless, I am able to prove that the range of $0.60-$0.92 for 2005 shareholder payouts per repatriated dollar is incorrect. The main trick I use to accomplish this is that I know the total amount of all repatriations-this has been publicly disclosed by the IRS. As a result, if I can show that a certain amount of spending did not occur for particular firms, I can translate this result into a bound on the total fraction of spending that occurred for all firms.
Because my data account for over 95% of repatriated funds, I can make strong statements that have implications for the Dharmapala et al. (2011) My work is silent on the methodological debate between Dharmapala et al. (2011) and Petersen and Faulkender (2012) . In terms of results, I generally agree more with those of Petersen and Faulkender (2012) , which show that there was little spending on shareholder payouts. In terms of methodology, however, I take a completely different tack than either of the prior studies by looking at individual firm spending and not comparing to a nonrepatriating but otherwise comparable benchmark firm. As a result, my approach only provides insight into the debate in the literature at the level of results, and not at the level of methodology.
There is additional prior research, including Blouin and Krull (2009) and Clemons and Kinney (2008) , that documents a significant increase in share repurchases following the AJCA holiday. These studies did not find as high a level of share repurchases as Dharmapala et al. Additional prior work that gives important insight into the consequences of the AJCA holiday includes Graham et al. (2010) , Redmiles (2008) , and Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2011). The researchers in Graham et al. (2010) conduct a detailed survey of tax executives and document the sources of repatriated cash and spending decisions by firms.
They find that most spending decisions were in line with the requirements of the AJCA, although they also find that cash that was "freed up" by the availability of repatriated funds was used to return value to shareholders. My results are not generally incompatible with these findings. Redmiles (2008) provides summary information and statistics related to repatriations that are contained in IRS records and would not otherwise be public. Unfortunately firm-specific information is not available because of rules regarding taxpayer privacy, but facts such as the total amount of funds repatriated are made available. The research in Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2011) describes in detail repatriation and other information about 19 firms making some of the largest repatriations, and certain information reported there would not otherwise be public. This report is very similar in spirit to my approach inasmuch as it focuses on a few large firms, rather than the wide swath of smaller repatriators. The research does not undertake any sort of statistical analysis or obtain results of the sort I describe here, however.
This work also relates to literature using cash shocks to study theories of capital markets.
For example, Blanchard et al. (1994) studied large litigation awards received by corporations.
They found that capital expenditures increased after the awards, and they found their evidence to be more supportive of theories of agency problems than of theories of costly external financing. Lamont (1997) studied internal capital markets of oil companies at the time of a sharp fall in oil prices. He found that investment in non-oil divisions fell when oil prices dropped, and this was inconsistent with theories of perfect capital markets, which would predict no such change in investment. Harford and Haushalter (2003) studied the impact of an increase in oil prices on oil companies. They found that financially constrained companies invested less than their unconstrained peers prior to the cash windfall, and they concluded, inconsistent with theories of perfect capital markets, that financial constraints affect firms' investment decisions. Rauh (2006) studied how corporate investment depends on internal financing constraints arising from exogenous changes in pension funding requirements. He used large-sample estimation to find that capital expenditures decline with increases in required pension contributions, a result inconsistent with theories of perfect capital markets.
In contrast to prior cash-flow shock studies, I measure the response by firm managers to the removal of a tax barrier to the internal flow of funds in a firm, subject to legal spending restrictions. This is an unusual situation. There is an opportunity to observe how management reacts to the ability to distribute capital more freely across different divisions of the firm. The observation is complicated, however, by the overlay of the spending rules.
The firms making the largest repatriations seem to be well-governed and not financially constrained. Thus there should be no agency problem or internal need for the funds, and, absent the spending rules, amounts should be paid out to shareholders. Because I find that this did not happen, my results seem to indicate that the cost of violating the rules was greater than the cost of foregoing an otherwise appropriate distribution and using the funds for suboptimal projects. The cost of a rule violation may entail the possibility of less favorable tax changes in the future. Unfortunately my analysis does not provide evidence for this claim beyond this informal argument, but investigation of such a possibility would seem to be an interesting direction for future research.
Background and Mechanics of Repatriations
Most details of the relevant legal and accounting rules are already explained well elsewhere, and so I will only describe briefly a few of the particularly pertinent aspects here. I refer the interested reader to Blouin and Krull (2009) for additional details.
In the U.S. tax system, U.S.-based corporations do not have to pay tax on the earnings of their overseas subsidiaries until a dividend of the earnings is made to the parent. When a dividend is made, a credit is allowed for foreign taxes that have been paid, but if the U.S. tax rate is greater than the foreign tax rate, the difference is due to the U.S. and 8 quarters. Second, the uses for the cash were restricted. The purposes for which cash could not be used were principally dividends, share repurchases, and executive compensation.
In addition to restrictions on cash usage, the law and subsequent guidance made it clear that certain particular uses were permitted. Foremost among these were expenditures for worker hiring and training, but because I do not have data regarding these items, I do not include them in my analysis. I am able to analyze several other items, however, including cash acquisitions, R&D, capital expenditures, debt reductions, and pension funding.
Despite its provision of detailed guidance regarding permitted uses of repatriated funds, the government also made it clear that no tracing or segregating of repatriated funds was required. Thus, it was possible for repatriated funds to be used directly for non-permitted purposes, as long as an equivalent amount of cash would eventually be spent on permitted projects. Moreover, firms were not required to show that ultimate permitted projects were not simply investments that would not otherwise have been planned notwithstanding the enactment of the AJCA. As a result, it is not necessarily the case that the restrictions would cause firms to deviate in a meaningful way from their previously planned pattern of expenses. Nevertheless, repatriating firms were required to file the details of their domestic reinvestment plan with the IRS, and they are subject to review and audit by the IRS to ensure that appropriate domestic investment of cash was actually made as required.
Finally, although firms needed to determine their domestic reinvestment plans at about the same time as the repatriating dividends were made, the investments pursuant to these plans were allowed to take place over a period of several years. Redmiles (2008) reports that about 70% of repatriating firms indicated that reinvestment would generally be completed by the end of 2007, more than three years after the start of the repatriation tax holiday. The remaining 30% did not expect to complete their reinvestment plans until a later point, and 6% reported a completion date later than the end of 2009.
Description of the Data
I collected information from public securities filings in order to construct a data set that would allow empirical analysis of the behavior of repatriating firms. If a firm undertook a repatriation large enough that it was judged material for purposes of financial reporting requirements, then the repatriation was generally described in the firm's annual report. In addition, even though APB 23 does not require a reserve for U.S. income taxes on earnings permanently reinvested overseas, firms still often report the amount of such foreign reinvestments in the footnotes of their financial filings, provided that the amount is large enough to be deemed material. As a result, annual 10-K filings provide a significant amount of information about the amount of permanently reinvested foreign earnings held by firms, as well as their decisions about whether to repatriate pursuant to the AJCA holiday.
To identify the set of firms of interest, I used used EDGAR Pro to search 10-K filings for references to permanently reinvested earnings during a one-year period surrounding the passage of the AJCA.
3 I then searched for these firms in Compustat and retained only those firms that both appeared in that database and also had non-zero foreign earnings at some point in the five-year period surrounding enactment of the AJCA. This resulted in a pool of 1,536 firms that had foreign earnings and appeared to make reference to permanently reinvested foreign earnings in their 10-Ks.
I reviewed the 10-Ks of the 1,536 firms by hand, with the assistance of computer searchand-find utilities, for up to two years after October 2004 to determine which firms had repatriated funds pursuant to the AJCA. This resulted in an identification of a subset of 440 firms that repatriated funds. In this repatriating group, 23 did not mention the specific amount repatriated, and I eliminated these from my sample because they were likely deemed immaterial by the firms for purposes of completing their securities filings. The remaining firms all mentioned positive amounts repatriated, and I recorded this datum for each firm. In some cases, the amount mentioned may have included certain non-qualifying dividends from foreign subsidiaries to the parent as well, but whenever possible I identified and recorded only that portion of dividends that qualified for favorable treatment under the AJCA. I also Redmiles (2008) . The dollar amounts are in billions. The percentages represent the fraction that aggregate repatriated cash for a group bears to all repatriated cash.
In addition to the hand-collected information about the repatriation status of each company, I collected information from Compustat with respect to several cash-flow and expense items for fiscal years from 1996 and 2009. I use these data to study the way in which repatriation of funds pursuant to the AJCA each item. I used cash flow values whenever possible, so as to detect expenditures of cash. In the case of R&D spending, no cash flow item is available, and so I use the value from the income statement instead. I generally treat missing values as zero. The start of the range of years I use is chosen to match the start of the period studied by Dharmapala et al. (2011) . The end of the range is chosen to include sufficient time for firms to complete most spending pursuant to the AJCA. It is important to consider this lengthy period of time subsequent to passage of the AJCA in 2004 because firms were permitted several years for carrying out their plans for spending repatriated funds in permissible ways. There was in fact no specific limit on the time period allowed, but, as reported by Redmiles (2008) , reinvestment periods spanned a long period of time, with at least 6% of firms planning reinvestments after the end of 2009.
Because I focus particularly on the firms that undertook the 20 largest repatriations, I
list these firms and their repatriation amounts in Table 2 : Firms with the largest 20 repatriations pursuant to the AJCA. The repatriation amounts indicated are in millions of dollars. The symbols in parentheses are the stock tickers that I use to refer to the firms in this paper.
To provide a better understanding of the nature of the top-20 firms, I tabulate the GICS sectors of these firms, firm sizes within their sectors, credit ratings, and measures of governance in respect to the G index, 13 of the 20 firms were at or below G = 9, which was the median score for all firms for which the index was calculated in 2004. With respect to the E index, 18 of the 20 firms were at or below E = 3, which was the median score for all firms for which the index was calculated in 2004. Lower scores correspond to better governance for both indices, and so it generally appears that most firms on the lists were well governed.
The top-20 firms also appear to have the characteristics required for the group that was the focus of the analysis in Dharmapala et al. (2011) . Firms were included in this group if they had a high tax cost of repatriating without a holiday or had a subsidiary in a tax haven. Table 4 : Upper bounds for shareholder payouts in 2005 by the 20 firms with the largest repatriations. The "Repat" column shows the amount of cash repatriated. The "Share Rep" and "Div" columns represent the positive amount of cash paid for share repurchases and dividends, respectively, but each capped at the total amount of cash repatriated. The "Total" column represents the sum of the prior two columns, with this sum again capped at the total amount of cash repatriated. The "Total/Repat" column represents the ratio of the immediately prior column to the total cash repatriated. All figures are in millions of dollars, and spending amounts are the numbers from fiscal year 2005.
larger fraction relative to the smaller group studied by Dharmapala et al. (2011) . As Table   4 (2011) focus. Their regressions were not dollar-weighted, and so it may be the case that firms in the subgroup making smaller repatriations were more numerous and carried out more impermissible spending than those making large repatriations. Such a phenomenon may be interesting to study, if it is correct. Whether it is true is a question for future research using the non-public data underlying the prior study. Even if it is true, it is important to emphasize that the $0.60-$0.92 range then applies only to the firms making small repatriations in the limited subgroup of repatriators Dharmapala et al. (2011) analyze.
The results of Dharmapala et al. (2011) are limited to this restricted arena and describe neither the typical dollar actually repatriated across all firms nor the majority of repatriated dollars in the subgroup they study.
Having refuted the validity of the $0.60-$0.92 range for 2005, I next consider the possibility that firms used repatriated funds for shareholder payouts at other times. As described in Section 3, each firm was given between 5 and 8 quarters, depending on its fiscal year end, to carry out repatriating dividends pursuant to the AJCA. It is natural to consider this range as the possible time during which shareholder payouts would occur, and so I compute bounds for this period using the same methodology outlined above. The new amounts computed for each firm are
where P Q is the sum of all cash spent on share repurchases and dividends for the quarters during which the firm was allowed to repatriate funds. The sum of the L Q values for all firms in my sample is $117.4 billion, and this corresponds to an absolute upper bound of $0.62 per dollar repatriated. This is slightly above the lower threshold of the range specified by Dharmapala et al. (2011) , but it reflects a longer time period than that study considers.
Also, because it is an absolute upper bound, it means that the subrange $0.62-$0.92 is an inaccurate description of shareholder payouts during this expanded time period as well.
In Figure 1 
Constrained Regression Analysis
I turn now to the question of how repatriated cash was really spent. My strategy is to consider each firm in isolation and use a constrained regression to determine the best possible firm-level point estimates for what spending actually took place, and when. This analysis is designed to detect changes in spending patterns within the same firm from the period before the AJCA was enacted to the period afterward. It also takes into account the constraint that spending with repatriated dollars on an item cannot exceed total spending on an item. This is a critical component of the analysis because, as was shown in Section 5, ignoring such a constraint can lead to erroneous results for spending of the typical dollar.
My methodology is different than that used in previous research in that I do not compare repatriating firms to non-repatriating counterparts. Such a technique is appropriate only when truly comparable non-repatriating firms exist. My goal, however, is to determine how the bulk of repatriated dollars were used, and this necessarily entails understanding the behavior of the handful of firms that made the biggest repatriations. As detailed in Section 4, these include many of the largest U.S.-based multinational corporations, particularly in the consumer staples, health care, and information technology sectors. For most such firms, there are generally no true comparables, and among those few firms that might be somewhat comparable, most in fact repatriated funds as well and so would not provide valid benchmarks. In addition, the firm-specific spending constraints that must be imposed vary independently by firm, year, and spending item. This serves to create a further mismatch between firms that might otherwise be considered comparable.
My model for spending by a firm on a particular item Y j is simply
where the sum in t runs through all the post-repatriation years analyzed, starting with t = 2005, since repatriations, and hence repatriation spending, were possible starting in
2005.
5 Here A represents firm assets, so that A t−1 is the lagged asset value, NI represents net income, R represents the total amount of the repatriation pursuant to the AJCA, and ǫ is an error term. The variable δ j,t is a dummy that is equal to 1 exactly in year t for the spending item Y j , and zero otherwise. The coefficients to be estimated are α 0 , α 1 , and ω j,t .
This model reflects the assumption that spending on the item Y j is generally driven by net income but that spending of repatriated dollars may have occurred with respect to the item in post-repatriation years. I impose constraints on the coefficients of the dummy variables in (1), namely
where the sum runs over all spending items j and all post-repatriation years t analyzed.
These reflect the requirements that spending of repatriated cash on an item in a given year must be non-negative, that spending with repatriated dollars cannot exceed the total spending that occurred, and that all the fractions ω j,t of repatriated spending in the several years and on the several items considered must sum to no more than one.
The values of α 0,j , α 1,j , and ω j,t must be determined simultaneously for all spending items j considered and all post-repatriation years t. An attempt to determine coefficients one spending item at a time would generally make it not possible to satisfy the last condition of (2), because this constraint links together the ω j,t values for the several spending items j. The optimization that must be carried out to determine the best point estimate for the constrained regression is thus min α j,0 ,α j,1
subject to the constraints in (2), where the sum over j runs through all spending items Y j and the sum in t runs through all pre-repatriation and post-repatriation years analyzed.
If the constraints are not binding, then the coefficients α 0,j , α 1,j , and ω j,t that solve this optimization problem are simply ordinary least squares estimates for the model in (1). In general, however, the constraints are binding for the problem of estimating spending by firms with large repatriations because the repatriation sizes frequently dwarf the size of various firms was 2005.
spending items, meaning that the upper bound in the first condition of (2) My methodology essentially provides a systematic and principled way to determine which post-repatriation items for a given firm appeared to be the most substantial outliers, relative to the firm's pre-repatriation spending, as well as which of these can best be accounted for by the amount of repatriated cash that was available, considering all appropriate constraints on repatriation spending.
Results from my optimization analysis are reported in Table 5 The result about acquisitions is striking in its magnitude, but it requires close scrutiny because it is driven by just a few firms and transactions. In fact, the seven firms listed above that concentrate their spending on acquisitions account for 95% of acquisition spend- A specific concern about the results for cash acquisitions might be that the optimization analysis simply latches on to particularly big spending items, such as those found in cash acquisitions. There are several firms that had large cash acquisition levels, however, for which no cash acquisition spending with repatriated dollars is indicated by the optimization. To see further evidence that the optimization is accomplishing what it should with respect to acquisitions, it can be helpful to consider the facts for some specific firms. Tables 6 and 7 provide details about net income, spending items, and lagged assets for Schering-Plough and Pfizer, respectively. In the case of Schering-Plough, it is manifest that the cash acquisition in 2007 is a plausible explanation of where the $9.4 billion in repatriated dollars was spent.
There simply were no share repurchases, and spending on dividends is too low to explain where the repatriated money was spent. In addition to spending on cash acquisitions, the increases in R&D and debt reductions in 2007 and 2008 are other plausible alternatives for repatriation spending, but they themselves are likely not large enough to explain the full use of repatriated dollars. Thus, the fact that the optimization estimates that acquisition was the one expenditure in this case is not unreasonable. For Pfizer, the situation is more complex, but again the only single item even close to large enough to account for the repatriation spending is the acquisition of Wyeth in 2009. Thus, in this case as well the result of the optimization procedure seems reasonable.
I provide more details about the actual acquisitions in question in Table 8 in the appendix.
There I describe the large acquisitions undertaken by these seven firms at the times indicated by the results of the optimization analysis. I have found no disclosures by firms that any of these acquisitions were intended to be uses of funds repatriated under the AJCA. In addition, it is known that firms were engaged in other tax planning techniques with respect to several of these acquisitions (Drucker, 2010) . These techniques involved repatriating additional offshore funds that were to be used for the acquisition, but doing so in such a way that full U.S. tax liability would not be incurred. It seems, however, that there was no prohibition about using techniques of this sort and also counting the money spent as a use of the repatriated dollars from the AJCA tax holiday. Such a two-fold tax benefit from a transaction may be a bit odd, but without a legal prohibition against such double counting, it seems that it might have been a possibility.
The results of the optimization analysis also provide information about when spending This could happen for a well-governed firms. The rationale could be that the appearance of disregard for the spirit of the legal prohibitions could have negative consequences for future tax policy and tax treatment of the firm. As a result, it could have been in the best interest of shareholders to delay payouts for a time, or at least to smooth them over the course of multiple years. My analysis relies on consolidated firm data, and so it does not guarantee that spending occurred domestically. For shareholder payouts, this is not an important consideration because such payouts were simply disallowed under the AJCA. For permissible types of spending, however, the AJCA generally required domestic usage of funds. In the case of acquisitions, I describe the several acquisitions that account for most of the spending, and the targets either are domestic or have significant domestic components. With respect to other items, such as debt reductions, future research determining the geographic locus of particular spending items would be useful.
Overall, my findings show that legal restrictions mattered. This should be of interest to academics and policy makers alike. Corporations that were well-governed and not financially constrained spent money according to legal rules imposed rather than paying it out quickly to shareholders. The shareholder payouts that did occur happened over time, suggestive of strategic planning by managers to avoid the appearance of violating the spirit, if not the letter, of the legal prohibitions. Non-payouts constituted the bulk of spending, however, and these generally occurred in accord with the guidelines set forth by the government.
My analysis cannot prove why this occurred, but a simple explanation is possible. Firms are engaged in a long-term game with the government, and although quick payouts may be optimal for shareholders in the short-term, such egregious violations of the spirit of the rules, even if technically legal, might harm shareholders by making future holidays and future favorable tax reform possibilities less likely. Thus firms, and particularly large visible firms, may have good reasons for conforming their behavior to the spirit of the law, as well as the letter.
Selected Data on Large Acquisitions with Cash
The optimization analysis I carry out estimates that seven of the top-20 repatriators spent at least half their repatriated dollars on cash acquisitions. Table 8 summarizes information about the the time and size of the acquisition spending estimates for these firms. It also provides details about contemporaneous large acquisitions undertaken by the firms. Not all acquisitions were entirely accomplished with cash, but all had at least a significant cash component. The acquisitions were generally of domestic firms. An exception is the purchase by Schering-Plough of Organon Biosciences, but this target had significant U.S.-based operations and assets. An acquisition could qualify as a permissible expense under the AJCA to the extent it was carried out with cash, and to the extent it reflected purchase of an interest in domestic assets the direct purchase of which would itself qualify as a permissible expense. For each firm, the total cash repatraition pursuant to the AJCA is indicated, as well as the years during which the optimization analysis estimated that repatriated cash was spent on acquisitions. The estimated amounts of spending in each year are also indicated. The final column describes large acquisitions with cash components undertaken by the firms at the relevant times.
